

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 0036

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SUBJECT: STATEMENTS BY DEPUTY MINISTER SEMENOV AND GENERAL TRUSOV
ON FEBRUARY 18, 1975 (SALT TWO - 520)

THE FOLLOWING ARE STATEMENTS DELIVERED BY DEPUTY MINISTER
SEMENOV AND GENERAL TRUSOV AT THE SALT TWO MEETING OF
FEBRUARY 18, 1975.

QUOTE

SEMENOV STATEMENT, FEBRUARY 18, 1975

TODAY THE USSR DELEGATION INTENDS TO OFFER CONSIDERA-
TIONS ON ARTICLE IX OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT. THIS ARTICLE
PROVIDES THAT UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT EACH SIDE WOULD
ASSUME THE OBLIGATION NOT TO DEVELOP, TEST OR DEPLOY
CERTAIN NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS.

THE USSR AND THE U.S. HAVE REACHED A COMMON UNDER-
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STANDING REGARDING THE ADVISABILITY OF INCLUDING PROVISIONS

ON THIS SCORE IN THE NEW AGREEMENT ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS; THIS IS ALSO REFLECTED IN THE SUMMIT UNDERSTANDING. THE AIDE-MEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974 EXPRESSLY STATES THAT THE NEW AGREEMENT COULD ALSO PROVIDE FOR ADDITIONAL LIMITATIONS ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS DURING ITS TERM.

LIMITATIONS OF THIS KIND WOULD ENHANCE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NEW AGREEMENT FOR THE PERIOD UNTIL 1985. THEY COULD ALSO HAVE A WIDER SIGNIFICANCE, INASMUCH AS THE SIDES WOULD BY MUTUAL CONSENT ASSUME THE OBLIGATION NOT TO DEVELOP OR DEPLOY CERTAIN NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, WHICH DO NOT EXIST AT PRESENT.

PROCEEDING FROM THIS, AND TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE FULL SCOPE OF THE FACTORS BEARING ON THIS PROBLEM, ARTICLE IX DELINEATES THE ASSORTMENT OF SYSTEMS WHOSE DEVELOPMENT, TESTING OR DEPLOYMENT WOULD BE BANNED. THEY INCLUDE:

-CRUISE MISSILES OF INTERCONTINENTAL RANGE.

BANNING THE DEVELOPMENT, TESTING OR DEPLOYMENT OF THESE MISSILES WILL PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF THE SIDES' ACQUIRING STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES, WHICH IN THEIR CAPABILITIES CAN BE COMPARABLE TO ICBMS.

-SEA-BASED CRUISE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS.

ASSUMPTION BY THE SIDES OF THE OBLIGATION TO BAN SUCH MISSILES WOULD PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF DEPLOYING THIS NEW TYPE OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, CAPABLE OF REACHING THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE FROM THE VAST AREAS OF THE SEAS AND OCEANS.

-BALLISTIC MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS ON WATERBORNE VEHICLES OTHER THAN SUBMARINES.

BANNING THE DEVELOPMENT, TESTING OR DEPLOYMENT OF THESE MISSILES WILL PREVENT THE APPEARANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES, WHICH COULD BE DEPLOYED ON ANY KIND OF SHIPS OR OTHER WATERBORNE VEHICLES. THIS WOULD

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BLOCK A POSSIBLE CHANNEL FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS IN EXCESS OF THE LIMITS ESTABLISHED UNDER THE NEW AGREEMENT.

-FIXED AND MOBILE DEVICES FOR LAUNCHING BALLISTIC MISSILES, WHICH COULD BE EMPLACED ON THE SEABED OR OCEAN FLOOR OR IN THE SUBSOIL THEREOF, INCLUDING THE TERRITORIAL SEA AND INLAND WATERS, OR WHICH COULD MOVE ONLY IN CONTACT

WITH THE BOTTOM.

AN OBLIGATION BY THE SIDES TO BAN THIS POSSIBLE TYPE OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS WOULD LEAD TO SAFEGUARDING THE NEW AGREEMENT AGAINST CIRCUMVENTION THROUGH A BUILD-UP IN THE NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS FOR SUCH MISSILES.

AN OBLIGATION BY THE SIDES NOT TO DEVELOP, TEST OR DEPLOY SUCH LAUNCHERS WOULD ALSO HAVE A POSITIVE SIGNIFICANCE IN TERMS OF STRENGTHENING THE 1971 TREATY ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE EMPLACEMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND OTHER WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION ON THE SEABED AND THE OCEAN FLOOR AND IN THE SUBSOIL THEREOF, TO WHICH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE U.S. ARE PARTIES. SUCH AN OBLIGATION WOULD EXTEND TO BOTH THE TERRITORIAL SEA AND INLAND WATERS.

-SYSTEMS FOR PLACING NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR ANY OTHER TYPES OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN EARTH ORBIT.

THE SIDES ATTACH GREAT IMPORTANCE TO ENSURING THAT OUTER SPACE BE USED FOR THE PURPOSES SPECIFIED IN THE TREATY ON PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF STATES IN THE EXPLORATION AND USE OF OUTER SPACE. PROCEEDING FROM THIS, SYSTEMS FOR PLACING NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR ANY OTHER TYPES OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN EARTH ORBIT SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE TEXT OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT AMONG OTHER NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS SUBJECT TO PROHIBITION.

BY BANNING IN THE NEW AGREEMENT SYSTEMS INTENDED FOR PLACING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EARTH ORBIT, THE SIDES WILL, IN PARTICULAR, ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO STRENGTHENING THE OBLIGATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN THE AFOREMENTIONED TREATY.

-MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLES FOR AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED, THE SIDES UNDERTOOK TO LIMIT THE NUMBER OF SLBM LAUNCHERS AND
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LAND-BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS, EQUIPPED WITH MIRVED MISSILES, TO AN AGGREGATE NUMBER NOT TO EXCEED 1,320 UNITS. BANNING MULTIPLE INDEPENDENTLY TARGETABLE REENTRY VEHICLES FOR AIR-TO-SURFACE MISSILES WOULD BE IN ACCORD WITH THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED AND WOULD PRECLUDE EXPANDING THE SPHERES FOR USING SUCH REENTRY VEHICLES.

BANNING THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS, DEALT WITH IN ARTICLE IX OF THE DRAFT, WOULD PRECLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF A SITUATION ARISING IN WHICH THE DECISION OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES TO LIMIT STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS QUANTITATIVELY AND QUALITATIVELY, WHICH IS THE HEART OF THE NEW AGREEMENT, COULD BE UNDERMINED AS A RESULT OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF AND BUILD-UP IN NEW STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES. ASSUMPTION BY THE

SIDES OF THE OBLIGATIONS PROVIDED FOR IN ARTICLE IX OF THE DRAFT WOULD THUS PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE FROM THE STANDPOINT OF ENSURING THE VIABILITY OF THE NEW AGREEMENT.

THIS WOULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE IN THE INTERESTS OF BOTH OUR STATES, WHICH ASSUMED THE JOINT OBLIGATION TO MAKE SPECIAL EFFORTS IN THE AREA OF LIMITING STRATEGIC ARMS, FOR THE PURPOSE OF STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND THE SECURITY OF PEOPLES.

IN THE STATEMENT AT THE MEETING OF FEBRUARY 4, 1975, THE USSR DELEGATION SET FORTH CONSIDERATIONS ON THE IMPORTANCE OF THE SIDES MANIFESTING RESTRAINT IN THE AREA OF STRATEGIC ARMS. THE OBLIGATIONS CONTAINED IN ARTICLE IX OF THE DRAFT, NOT TO DEVELOP, TEST OR DEPLOY THE NEW TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS NAMED THEREIN, WOULD BECOME A CONVINCING EXAMPLE OF THE READINESS OF THE SIDES TO ACT IN PRECISELY THIS MANNER; THIS WOULD BE OF SUBSTANTIAL IMPORTANCE IN OVERALL POLITICAL TERMS AS WELL.

IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC ARMS, DISCUSSIONS HAVE ALREADY TAKEN PLACE, IN THE COURSE OF WHICH THE SOVIET SIDE PRESENTED EXTENSIVE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF BANNING IN THE NEW AGREEMENT THE DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF SOME SPECIFIC TYPES OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS. THIS QUESTION
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HAS BEEN IN THE FIELD OF VISION OF THE SIDES FOR A CONSIDERABLE PERIOD OF TIME, AND YOU ARE ACQUAINTED WITH THE RATIONALE OF THE SOVIET SIDE. MOREOVER, WE BELIEVE THAT A CERTAIN COINCIDENCE OR PROXIMITY OF POINTS OF VIEW HAS DEVELOPED WITH RESPECT TO A NUMBER OF ASPECTS. THE LANGUAGE OF ARTICLE IX WAS WORKED OUT WITH AN ACCOUNT FOR THE DISCUSSIONS HELD AND THE COMMON UNDERSTANDING ADOPTED. SOME NUANCES OF THE PROBLEM HAVE NOT BEEN DISCUSSED EARLIER, BUT BY THEIR NATURE AND DIRECTION THEY HAVE THE SAME MEANING.

PROCEEDING FROM THE ABOVE, WE ANTICIPATE THAT ARTICLE IX OF THE DRAFT WILL MEET WITH UNDERSTANDING AND A POSITIVE RESPONSE ON THE PART OF THE U.S. DELEGATION.

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 SALT TWO GENEVA 0036

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QUOTE:

TRUSOV STATEMENT, FEBRUARY 18, 1975

AT PREVIOUS MEETINGS THE QUESTION HAS BEEN RAISED AS TO PRECISELY WHICH STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES MUST BE INCLUDED IN THE AGREED AGGREGATE NUMBER OF SUCH VEHICLES, NOT TO EXCEED 2,400 UNITS FOR EACH SIDE.

IN ITS STATEMENT OF FEBRUARY 6, 1975, THE USSR DELEGATION DREW YOUR ATTENTION TO THE FACT THAT THE ANSWER TO THIS QUESTION IS CONTAINED IN THE DECISIONS REACHED DURING THE SUMMIT MEETING.

ACCORDINGLY, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT CUSTOMARY PRACTICE IN DRAWING UP TREATY DOCUMENTS, AND ABOVE ALL DOCUMENTS CONCERNING STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATIONS, ARTICLE II, PARAGRAPH 2, OF THE DRAFT AGREEMENT CONTAINS A CLEARLY WORDED PROVISION REGARDING PRECISELY WHICH DELIVERY VEHICLES SHALL BE COUNTED IN THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES, ESTABLISHED BY THE UNDERSTANDING.

IN THE STATEMENT OF FEBRUARY 10, 1975, YOU,
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MR AMBASSADOR, EXPRESSED CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING SOME

DEFINITIONS IN CONNECTION WITH THE NEW AGREEMENT. YOU RIGHTLY NOTED THAT THE PRECEDENTS INVOLVED IN THE AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED EARLIER WILL ASSIST US IN RESOLVING SOME OF THE PROBLEMS. AS FOR THE DEFINITIONS OF LAUNCHERS FOR ICBMS AND MODERN SLBMS, WE HAVE HAD CONSIDERABLE EXPERIENCE IN USING THEM, WHICH HAS CONFIRMED THE VIABILITY OF THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED IN CONNECTION WITH THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. WE BELIEVE THAT THE RELEVANT DEFINITIONS, WHICH WERE ADOPTED IN CONNECTION WITH THE INTERIM AGREEMENT, SHOULD BE RETAINED WITH RESPECT TO THE NEW DRAFT AGREEMENT BEING WORKED OUT.

IN THE COURSE OF PREVIOUS NEGOTIATIONS, HEAVY BOMBERS HAVE BEEN COMPREHENSIVELY DISCUSSED AND AN AGREED SOLUTION BECAME APPARENT IN THEIR RESPECT. THE SOVIET SIDE BELIEVES THAT HEAVY BOMBERS MUST INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING NUCLEAR DELIVERY AIRCRAFT: FOR THE US--B-52 AND B-1, FOR THE USSR--TUPOLEV-95 AND MYASISHCHEV, AS WELL AS NEW AIRCRAFT BEING OR TO BE DEVELOPED, HAVING CHARACTERISTICS SIMILAR TO THE B-1 BOMBER.

SUCH A DEFINITIONS COULD ALSO BE DRAWN UP IN THE FORM OF AN APPROPRIATE AGREED STATEMENT.

WITH RESPECT TO AIR TO SURFACE MISSILES WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS, ON FEBRUARY 12, 1975 THE USSR DELEGATION SET FORTH ITS QUITE PRECISE UNDERSTANDING OF THIS QUESTION. THE WORDING OF ARTICLE II, PARAGRAPH 2, PROVIDING THAT WHEN BOMBERS ARE EQUIPPED WITH AIR TO SURFACE MISSILES OF ANY TYPE WITH A RANGE OF MORE THAN 600 KILOMETERS, EACH SUCH MISSILE WILL BE COUNTED AS ONE UNIT IN THE AGGREGATE NUMBER OF STRATEGIC WEAPON DELIVERY VEHICLES, IS STRICTLY IN ACCORD WITH THE UNDERSTANDING RECORDED IN THE AIDEMEMOIRE OF DECEMBER 10, 1974.

IN THIS CONNECTION WE CANNOT UNDERSTAND AN APPROACH WHICH IS CONTRARY TO THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED.

THE US DELEGATIONS STATEMENT OF FEBRUARY 10, 1975 RAISED THE QUESTION OF DEFINING A HEAVY ICBM. FRANKLY, THE MOTIVES FOR RAISING THIS QUESTION ARE COMPLETELY UNCLEAR.

THE QUESTION OF MISSILE VOLUME HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF LENGTHY AND COMPREHENSIVE DISCUSSION AS FAR BACK AS DURING THE WORKING OUT OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. AT THAT
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TIME THE SIDES REACHED AN AGREED DECISION CONCERNING THE PLACING OF APPROPRIATE LIMITATIONS ON LAUNCHERS, AS RECORDED IN ARTICLE II OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. IT PRECLUDES THE POSSIBILITY OF USING LAUNCHERS FOR LIGHT LAND BASED ICBMS AND LAUNCHERS FOR LAND BASED ICBMS OF OLDER TYPES, TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF LAUNCHERS FOR HEAVY LAND BASED ICBMS. IT IS NOT ACCIDENTAL, THEREFORE, THAT AN UNDERSTANDING WAS REACHED AT THE SUMMIT TO RETAIN IN

THE NEW AGREEMENT ARTICLE II OF THE INTERIM AGREEMENT. THE WORKING OF ARTICLE IV OF THE DRAFT OF THE NEW AGREEMENT IS FULLY IN ACCORD WITH THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED.

AS FOR CONSIDERATIONS ON THROWWEIGHT, THERE IS HARDLY ANY NEED TO REPEAT THE RATIONALE CITED EARLIER REGARDING ITS COMPLETE UNACCEPTABILITY AS A CRITERION FOR ANY KIND OF LIMITATIONS OR DEFINITIONS.

THE QUESTION OF LIGHT AND HEAVY MISSILES WAS QUITE DEFINITELY RESOLVED AT THE SUMMIT, BY PLACING APPROPRIATE LIMITATIONS ON THEIR LAUNCHERS, AND THERE IS NO NEED TO INTRODUCE ANY SORT OF NEW ELEMENTS THAT OBVIOUSLY COMPLICATE THE MATTER.

THE COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF MAY 26, 1972, REGARDING LIMITATIONS ON INCREASING THE DIMENSIONS OF LAND BASED ICBM LAUNCHERS IN THE PROCESS OF MODERNIZATION, COULD BE RECORDED IN THE FORM OF AN APPROPRIATE AGREED STATEMENT OF THE SIDES. UNQUOTE. JOHNSON

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